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Taking Multinational
Corporate Codes of Conduct
to the Next Level
(FORTHCOMING VOLUME 43:2 OF THE COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW (2005))
© Sean D. Murphy*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1997, Professor Oscar Schachter of Columbia University Law School predicted a
continuing decline of the nation-state and a continuing emergence of new structures and norms to
regulate transnational activities.1 His prediction captured many demonstrable features of our evolving
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Steve Charnovitz and Steve Schooner for very helpful comments, and to José E. Arvelo-Vélez for
superb research assistance.

1

Oscar O. Schachter, The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implications for
International Law, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 7, 23 (1997):
Global enterprise and communication networks will continue to produce rules and
procedures for transnational activities, many of which, like the lex mercatoria, will have
only a limited link to national and international law. We can expect a greater mix and
overlap of public and private international law with the line between them rather blurred.
Movements toward democracy—liberal or populist—manifested through civil society
will also influence international responses and add to human rights law and to principles
of collective recognition. There will probably be new international “persons” and new
conceptions of property and equity entering into international law. State may be declining
in power, but the horizons of international law continue to expand.

2
international society. States are declining in their role as the predominant structure for ordering
transnational relations, although in my view the phenomenon is one where states are continuing to
do what they have always done—they are just not keeping up with the surge in transnational
commercial, financial, service, health and informational relations.
Rather than address broadly the issue of whether and how nations are in decline as the means
for ordering transnational relations, this essay focuses on one feature of the emerging transnational
normative regime: codes of conduct, often relating to labor, environmental or human rights issues,
that seek to constrain socially undesirable behavior of transnational, non-state actors. Such codes of
conduct typically focus on the multinational corporation (MNC),2 by which is meant a corporation
with affiliated business operations in more than one country,3 with a particular eye to the activities
of MNCs in the developing world, where governments are often unwilling or unable to regulate
MNCs effectively. Codes of conduct of this type should be distinguished from private transnational
codes that corporations find useful in efficiently selling goods and services across borders, such as
the International Chamber of Commerce’s Incoterms4 or UCP,5 or in protecting the security of such

2

There are variants to this term, such as transnational corporation (TNC) or multinational
enterprise (MNE)
3

For a brief discussion of what constitutes an “MNC,” see PETER MUCHLINSKI,
MULTINAT IONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 12-15 (1995).
4

INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE , INCOTERMS 2000: ICC OFFICIAL RULES FOR
THE INTERPRETATION OF TRADE TERMS (1998); see Jan Ramberg, ICC Guide to Incoterms 2000:
Understanding and Practical Use (1999).
5

International Chamber of Commerce, Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary
Credits (UCP 500) (1993); see Charles del Busto, ICC Guide to Documentary Credit Operations
for the UCP500 (1994).
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transactions, such as standards to enhance the security of digital or Internet transactions.6 The latter
are codes of conduct developed by private actors (and that are sometimes incorporated legally into
their relations through contractual clauses)7 and are certainly a critical component of transnational
private behavior, but they raise less concerns regarding adherence to the codes because MNCs are
effective in maintaining, refining, and self-policing such codes, it being in their direct economic
interest to do so.8
The non-state actor codes of conduct at issue in this essay, by contrast, are ones that
corporations do not perceive as facilitating business transactions, at least not directly. Rather, these
codes of conduct seek to promote socially-responsible MNC conduct, largely in the developing
world, so as to prevent harm or mistreatment of persons or things caused by MNC operations (e.g.,
the existence of unhealthy worker conditions in an MNC factory). Such harm or mistreatment need
not be a core concern for the corporate actor; indeed, the MNC—in theory fundamentally driven to

6

See, e.g., International Chamber of Commerce, General Usage for International Digitally
Ensured Commerce (1977), at <http://www.iccwbo.org/home/guidec/guidec_one/guidec.asp>;
William F. Fox Jr., The International Chamber of Commerce’s GUIDEC Principles: PrivateSector Rules for Digital Signatures, 35 INT ’L LAW . 71 (2001).
7

Oscar Schachter principally spoke to this sort of transnational law in his discussion of
the impact of global capitalism. Schachter, supra note 1, at 10-12 (“Such law tends to reflect
economic power and private interests and to escape scrutiny in light of community values.”).
While Schachter also addressed the impact of non-governmental organizations or civil society
groups on the development of international law, id. at 13-14, he did not directly address the issue
of various corporate and civil society stakeholders developing codes of conduct that implement
international law. This essay seeks to carry his discussion further by addressing that topic.
8

For a general discussion of private sector codes of conduct, see Virginia Haufler,
Private Sector International Regimes, in NON -STATE ACTORS AND AUTHORITY IN THE GLOBAL
SYSTEM 212 (Richard A. Higgott et al. eds., 2000).
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maximize its profits although in practice driven by various factors9—may benefit far more by
inflicting the harm or mistreatment than by engaging in socially-responsible behavior. Only in
reaction to outrage and discontent by other actors (governments, non-governmental organizations,
or “civil society” groups) might the MNC see a value in developing a code of conduct that, if
adhered to, would reduce the harm or mistreatment the MNC inflicts on others.10
Due to a vacuum of governmental regulation of MNCs in the developing world, these
codes—a form of private regulation—has emerged to deal with the adverse social effects of MNC
activity. For example, perhaps the best-known code of conduct for MNCs was developed with
respect to MNC activity in South Africa in the 1980’s, commonly referred to as the “Sullivan
Principles.”11 Created in 1977 by the Reverend Leon H. Sullivan, a Philadelphia pastor who was a
member of General Motors Board of Trustees, the Sullivan Principles arose due to increasingly
strident public criticism of Western MNCs with operations in South Africa, where the government
was actively engaged in a system of apartheid, in which non-whites were systematically denied basic
civil and political rights, and denied fundamental employment, education, and housing opportunities.
In response, leading MNCs pledged themselves to the Sullivan Principles, which consisted of six
principles (later amplified in 1978) for how MNCs operating in South Africa should conduct
themselves with respect to apartheid. For example, one principle called for no racial segregation in
9

See Michael K. Addo, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations—An
Introduction, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS 15 (Michael K. Addo ed., 1999) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS].
10

See, e.g., EMEKA A. DURUIGBO , MULTINAT IONAL CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW : ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMPLIANCE ISSUES IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 106-117 (2003).
11

Sullivan Principles for U.S. Corporations Operating in South Africa, 24 I.L.M. 1494
(1985) (hereinafter “Sullivan Principles”).
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eating, comfort, and work facilities, while another called for increasing the number of non-whites
in management and supervisory positions.12 MNCs were called upon to pledge themselves
voluntarily to the Sullivan Principles and over the course of the fifteen years that they existed (until
South Africa abandoned apartheid) some 150 MNCs made such pledges.13 The initial Sullivan
Principles spawned a more general code in 1999, known as the Global Sullivan Principles of Social
Responsibility. 14 That code also contains eight principles whereby MNCs pledge, among other
things, to “[r]espect our employees’ voluntary freedom of association”; “[c]ompensate our
employees to enable them to meet at least their basic needs”; and “[p]rovide a safe and healthy
workplace; protect human health and the environment; and promote sustainable development.”15
Hundreds of MNCs (including ChevronTexaco, Coca-Cola, and General Motors) and other entities,
such as local governments and educational institutions, have pledged themselves to these
principles.16 Such MNCs typically then assert that they have revised their internal policies so as to

12

Id., principles 1, 5.

13

For an analysis for the Sullivan Principles and their success, see S. Prakash Sethi &
Oliver F. Williams, Creating and Implementing Global Codes of Conduct: An Assessment of the
Sullivan Principles as a Role Model for Developing International Codes of Conduct—Lessons
Learned and Unlearned, 105 BUS. & SOC’Y REV . 169 (2000); S. PRAKASH SETHI, SETTING
GLOBAL STANDARDS 95-109 (2003).
14

Global Sullivan Principles of Social Responsibility (1999), at
http://www.globalsullivanprinciples.org/principles.htm.
15
16

Id.

Companies and Organizations Endorsing the Global Sullivan Principles (Oct. 9, 2002),
at http://www.globalsullivanprinciples.org/Endorser_list_Oct9.PDF.

6
be in accordance with the principles.17
The two broad tendencies observed by Oscar Schachter with respect to the decline of the
nation-state may be discerned within the dynamic by which codes—such as the Sullivan
Principles—are formed.18 Multinational corporations inherently emphasize the free market as the
primary means of organizing transnational corporate behavior; for them, government control and
interference may be necessary in some respects, but should be kept at an absolute minimum.
Consequently, to the extent that new principles based on “socially desirable behavior” are to be
applied to corporate conduct, MNCs are far more attracted to codes that are self-applied, that are
tailored to the MNC’s unique situation, and that are not dictated by government regulation. Civil
society groups, in an ideal world, might press for greater governmental regulation of MNCs, but they
too are skeptical about the efficacy of government involvement, not because they distrust
government interference generally, but because they doubt they can achieve their goals through
government power.19 Such groups note that governments in the developed world resist regulating
MNCs abroad, and if pressed to issue regulations, might set lower standards than may be achieved

17

See, e.g., Proctor & Gamble, 2003 Sustainability Report: Linking Opportunity with
Responsibility 25 (2003) (“We have reviewed and revised our policies to make sure we are
aligned with the Global Sullivan Principles.”), available at
http://www.pg.com/company/our_commitment/sustainability.jhtml;jsessionid=23JXSG4ALAX2
1QFIAJ1SZOWAVABHMLHC#.
18
19

Schachter, supra note 1, at 21-22.

See Robin Broad & John Cavanagh, The Corporate Accountability Movement: Lessons
and Opportunities, 23:2 FLETCHER FORUM WORLD AFF. 151, 167 (1999) (“With governments
less willing or able to take on the problems of global corporations, [non-governmental
organizations in the 1990s] have attempted to harness their own growing countervailing power
and have pressed for new forms of enforcement of new rules that do not depend on
governments.”).

7
in voluntary codes. Further, civil society groups are aware that governments in the developing world
often lack the capacity or the will to regulate MNCs; indeed, authoritarian or non-democratic regimes
may be uninterested in addressing broad social concerns. Instead, civil society groups stress the need
for codes that foster greater participatory democracy within the corporate structure, whereby workers
are able to unionize to seek better wages and working conditions, and whereby consumers and
shareholders of the corporation are made aware of corporate conduct and are empowered to act if
such conduct deviates from acceptable behavior. Moreover, in crafting such codes, both MNCs and
civil society groups favor mechanisms for non-governmental monitoring of corporate behavior and
certification of good corporate behavior. Thus, neither side (Schachter labels the two tendencies as
being the “right” and the “left) is particularly focused on the role of government and, indeed, both
sides “have had some influence in weakening the autonomy of states.”20
This essay proceeds in Part II by briefly summarizing the rise of these codes of conduct, with
particular attention to certain highly visible examples, such as the United Nations Global Compact,
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, and the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) environmental management
system standards. Part III notes the many criticisms that have been levied against such codes and
speculates that, over the long term, such codes may not survive in their present form. Part IV
suggests a new approach to thinking about these codes, one that might enhance their legitimacy,
effectiveness, and credibility. In essence, this essay urges that greater thought be given by all
stakeholders to an increased role for governments in the development and implementation of such
codes. While transforming the codes wholesale into binding law is not politically feasible at this
20

Id. at 22.
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time, and may never be economically desirable, other means of governmental involvement should
be considered. For instance, governments can play a better role in bringing stakeholders together to
form such codes and do better at identifying what types of codes are effective and which are not.
Governments might do better at using national laws and regulations to make adherence to such codes
more attractive, such as by using the codes to help reduce regulatory uncertainty and as “safe
harbors” for MNCs against criminal or civil penalties. At the same time, governments might use
national laws to regulate better MNC use of the codes, such as by compelling disclosure of
information about MNC adherence to the code. The role of governments would not be one of state
control of corporate activity but, rather, one of helping empower the individual autonomy of
corporations within certain bounds of justice, fairness, and equity.

II.

THE RISE OF NON -STATE ACTOR CODES

A.

The Impetus for Such Codes.

The activities of MNCs provide significant benefits in creating wealth in states where they
operate, through creation of jobs, production of goods and services, efficient use of technology, labor
and capital, development of export markets, and concomitant growth in gross domestic product by
exporting states.21 While much of the increased MNC activity of the 1990’s22 was among states of
21
22

See, e.g., ROBERT GILPIN , THE CHALLENG E OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM 172-78 (2000).

The explosion of MNC activity in the 1990’s may be seen whether one looks at MNC
sales, foreign employment, or foreign investment. For example, from 1990 to 2000, sales by the
one hundred largest MNCs rose from $3.2 trillion to nearly $4.8 trillion and employment of
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the developed world, a portion included the movement of MNC operations to the developed world
to take advantage of a cheaper supply of labor and other resources.23 Indeed, though the story of the
1970’s and 1980’s may have been one of developing countries seeking to nationalize or expropriate
foreign investment as a means of stemming post-colonial economic “neo-colonization,”24 the story
of the 1990’s was one of developing states realizing the great benefits of attracting foreign
investment and technology, so as to develop export economies of their own.25
At the same time, concerns have arisen from this increased MNC activity in the developing
world. One aspect of the investment in developing countries is a greater willingness of developing
countries to allow MNCs to own or manage projects in key public sectors, such as energy,
telecommunications, transport, water, and sanitation. While there may be benefits from privatizing
decision-making in such sectors, it means that core societal needs and natural resources are largely
controlled by entities that governments may not have the capacity to hold accountable for customer

persons outside the MNC’s home country rose from 24 million to 54 million, while from 1996 to
2000 the value of cross-border mergers and acquisitions rose from $94 billion to an astounding
$866 billion. See UN CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT : 2002: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS
xv, 12, 90 (2002).
23

For example, the number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions in developing
countries increased during 1995-1999 by fifty percent. See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 2001: BUILDING COALITIONS FOR EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE
40-41 (2001).
24

See CYNTHIA DAY WALLACE , THE MULTINAT IONAL ENTERPRISE AND LEGAL CONTROL
36-37, 70-71 (2002).
25

Id. at 42-45.
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service and compliance with local laws.26 Some observers assert that the distribution of wealth
generated by MNCs when they operate in developing countries has been largely skewed in favor of
the MNCs (and their shareholders) and against laborers.27 Moreover, the working conditions for
laborers for MNCs in developing countries are often very poor: laborers have difficulty unionizing;
factory conditions generally are unhealthful; child labor is common.28 Environmental standards in
developing states tend to be low or unenforced, often allowing relatively unchecked emissions of air
pollutants and toxic materials.
One response to such concerns is to argue that MNCs are simply taking advantage of
favorable business climates found in other countries; if those countries wish to impose higher
minimum wage rates or better working conditions, they are free to do so. Some developing states
have established labor and environmental laws to protect local resources, but they often lack the
resources to enforce them, and MNCs take advantage of such lack of enforcement.29 Further, host

26

See Theodore Panayotou, The Role of the Private Sector in Sustainable Infrastructure
Development, in BRIDGES TO SUSTAINABILITY : BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT WORKING
TOGETHER FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT 46, 60 (Luis Gomez-Echeverri ed., 1997), available at
http://www.yale.edu/environment/publications/bulletin/101pdfs/101panayotou.pdf.
27

See SETHI, supra note 13, at 5-7.

28

ELLIOT J. SCHRAGE, REPORT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
TO THE U.S. DEP ’T OF STATE, PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL WORKER RIGHTS THROUGH PRIVATE
VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES: PUBLIC RELATIONS OR PUBLIC POLICY? 5-6 (Jan. 2004) [hereinafter
SCHRAGE], available at http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Schrage-DOS.pdf.
29

For example, a recent report prepared by the staffs of the UN Development Programme,
the UN Environment Programme, the World Bank, and the World Resources Institute found that,
in regulating MNCs, governmental
command and control regulation has many limitations. Its success rests on vigorous and
timely enforcement. This is difficult in countries where state authority is weak, budgets
are constrained, or technical capacity is low. The rigidity of these regulations is also a
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countries sensitive to the adverse social affects of MNC activity may be in a weak position if creating
better laws or enforcing existing laws results in movement of MNCs to other countries.30 Finally, the
response assumes that the host government is sensitive to the interests of its nationals; while such
an assumption may be valid in democratic states, in more authoritarian or non-democratic states the
interests of the government may not coincide with those of its people.31 Ironically, while MNCs have
emerged and thrived from the establishment of strong developed-state economies that are based on
democracy, the rule of law, and independent judiciaries, some MNCs are taking advantage of the
absence of such conditions in developing countries. By way of example, Nike Inc.—with $9.5 billion
in revenues, it is the largest global marketer of athletic footwear, apparel and equipment—outsources
97 percent of its footwear products to factories in four countries: China, Indonesia, Thailand, and
Vietnam. Those countries are all characterized by highly repressive and corrupt governmental
regimes that provide little if any enforcement of their own labor and environmental laws.32

problem. Many companies and policy-makers contend that standard government
regulation doesn’t leave them the flexibility to fix environmental problems in the most
efficient ways and doesn’t encourage improvements beyond those specified by law.
UN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME ET AL., WORLD RESOURCES: 2002-2004: DECISIONS FOR THE
EARTH: BALANCE , VOICE, AND POWER 108 (2003).
30

See, e.g., id. (“Nor do traditional regulations address the governance challenges posed
by the increasing globalization of corporate activity. In the face of competition to attract
business, some nations are less willing or able to regulate transnational corporations effectively.
In this case, transnationals largely regulate themselves, with little accountability to communities
or consumers for their impacts . . . .”) John Parkinson, The Socially Responsible Company, in
HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 57 (“the proposition that [MNCs] need do no more
than obey local laws will in many cases be morally unappealing. In the absence of mandatory
international standards, again the need for self-regulation is indicated.”).
31

See Addo, supra note 9, at 24.

32

SETHI, supra note 13, at 154.
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In short, MNCs operating in developing countries have done what one would expect them
to do in a free market; seek out the least expensive means of conducting operations so as to
maximize profits. The problem is that, in doing so, they have been viewed as inflicting unacceptable
harm and mistreatment. As human rights, labor rights, and environmental rights continue to advance
within the global consciousness, the practices of many MNCs in developing countries have been
regarded as out of step with social expectations. This gap, in turn, has led to strident criticism of
MNC activity, and sometimes to consumer backlash whereby MNCs are faced with demands for
products certified as having been produced without adverse social consequences.33
MNCs themselves recognize this divergence of MNC operations from social expectations,
and consequently many have embraced the movement toward voluntary codes of conduct that
inculcate key norms in the fields of labor, human rights, consumer protection, anticorruption, and
the environment. To date, these codes have taken many shapes and sizes, but they generally can be
characterized as follows. The codes are voluntary in nature; MNCs are not forced to adopt the codes
but, rather, pledge themselves to the code because they see it as in their interests to do so. The codes
typically consist of a series of principles, standards or guidelines, which may be broad and
aspirational in nature or may be more detailed and operational in nature. In developing the norms
contained in the codes, the codes may draw on or refer to international law norms (particularly in the
field of international labor or environmental law, or human rights law), may focus on MNC
adherence to local laws, and/or may call for adherence to norms articulated solely in the code itself.
A code might be developed ad hoc for a specific company (sometimes referred to as an “operational”
33

See Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product Labeling Schemes:
The Limits and Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights Standards Through Private
Initiatives, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT ’L BUS. 111 (1998).
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or “internal” code). Alternatively, a code might be developed for a class of companies in a particular
field (e.g., the apparel or extractive industries) or for companies generally (sometimes referred to as
“model” or “external” codes) which can then, in turn, lead to the creation of associated operational
codes.34 The codes might be drafted solely by private sector entities, usually bringing together a
range of stakeholders, such as labor groups, environmental groups, religious groups, and corporate
groups. Alternatively, the codes might be drafted under the auspices of governments or by
government representatives working through international organizations, although even then relevant
stakeholders are typically a part of the drafting process.
Once a code is established, typically an MNC is expected to pledge itself publicly to the code
and develop internal corporate rules or policies based on the code. MNC managers are then trained
to comply with those rules or policies in corporate decision-making and operations. While the codes
normally call upon the MNC to make public its decision to adhere to the code, further transparency
regarding corporate adherence to the code may not be required. Different techniques of monitoring,

34

For detailed studies of codes of conduct adopted within certain broad industry sectors,
with particular attention to comparison of “external” codes with the “internal” codes that they
spawn, see WORLD BANK GROUP CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY PRACTICE , COMPANY
CODES OF CONDUCT AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS: ANALYT ICAL COMPARISON: PART I OF II
(Oct. 2003), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/privatesector/csr/doc/Company%20Codes%20of%20Condu
ct.pdf; OECD, Codes of Corporate Conduct: Expanded Review of Their Contents (May 2001),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/24/1922656.pdf; Andrew Wilson & Chris
Gribben, Business Responses to Human Rights (Apr. 2000), available at
http://www.acbas.org/Web/AshAcbas.nsf/pdfs/Response/$file/Response.PDF; Michael
Urminsky, ed., Self-Regulation in the Workplace: Codes of Conduct; Social Labeling and
Socially Responsible Investment 9-34 (undated working paper), available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/multi/download/wp1mcc.pdf.; Janelle Diller, A
Social Conscience in the Global Marketplace? Labour Dimensions of Codes of Conduct, Social
Labelling and Investor Initiatives, 138 INT ’L LABOUR REV . 99, 112-17 (1999).

14
verification, audits, or certification might be an element of a particular code,35 but in any event the
codes often do not require such steps by an entity external to the MNC. Since the codes are
voluntary, MNCs are not exposed to any criminal or civil penalties in the event that they fail to abide
by the codes (they remain, of course, exposed to penalties if the MNC violates relevant national
laws). Thus, the codes are not enforced by governments.
A difficult problem with the codes concerns corporate structures. In many instances, an MNC
may engage in business with a foreign government or a foreign company over whom the MNC does
not exercise any corporate control. In such instances, the MNC may have adopted a particular code
for itself, but have no power to impose the code on its partners. (Indeed, less-than-scrupulous MNCs
may structure their business relations so as to take advantage of the lack of corporate control over
partners.) Some codes seek to address this problem by calling upon MNCs only to engage in
commercial relations with partners, suppliers, or distributors that either adhere to a code or whose
conduct is compatible with the code.36 For example, “sourcing guidelines” of a buyer might specify
the workplace requirements of other enterprises in the supply chain.37 Yet even MNCs that are
interested in promoting a code with their partners may find it difficult to do so. Success may turn on
factors outside the control of the MNC, such as the geographic concentration of production markets;
the narrowness of the supply base; the degree of vertical integration within an industry and of overlap

35

See OECD, Making Codes of Corporate Conduct Work: Management Control Systems
and Corporate Responsibility (Feb. 2001), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/29/1922806.pdf.
36

See, e.g., infra note 80 and accompanying text.

37

See Diller, supra note 34, at 103.
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with other industries; and the overall concentration of the global market.38
Since the codes are voluntary in nature, the codes are not written to impose constraints that
MNCs would find onerous; instead, the codes are crafted to promote conduct that entails some costs
to the MNC, but costs that are outweighed by the benefits to the MNCs. The costs to MNCs include
the basic expenses involved both in altering internal corporate rules and policies, training personnel
regarding the new policies, and pursuing any internal or external associated monitoring, verification,
audits, or certification, and in internalizing costs that had previously been externalized (e.g., paying
higher wages, avoiding environmental harms, etc.). The benefits to MNCs can potentially take
various forms. Arguably there will be some internal cost savings achieved, such as from more
efficient use of resources (e.g., achieved when pursuing waste reduction), or from having a heathier
and thus more productive work force. Cost savings may also arise if adherence to such a code allows
the MNC to save on insurance premiums or have access to capital at lower rates, if insurers or
lenders are concerned about possible adverse consequences of MNC activities. To the extent that the
code is adopted by an MNC’s competitors, then the code may assist in creating a level playing field
for the MNC so that its good corporate conduct does not put it at a competitive disadvantage. Finally,
by adhering to such a code, the MNC may enjoy an enhanced public image, thus avoiding
shareholder dissatisfaction with management, consumer boycotts of MNC goods or services, labor
unrest, and undesirable regulation by either its host or home governments.39
Over the past thirty years, with the rise of MNC activities in the developing world, these

38
39

SCHRAGE, supra note 28, at 173-75.

See, e.g., Simon Williams, How Principles Benefit the Bottom Line: The Experience of
the Co-operative Bank, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 63.
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codes have proliferated.40 The next section provides a brief tour de table of some of the more
interesting transnational codes of conduct that have emerged, along with some of the criticisms of
those codes.

B.

Selected Codes of Conduct.

UN Draft Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations. Any discussion of the
emergence of corporate codes of conduct should probably begin with either the Sullivan Principles
(discuss above) or the failed effort by the United Nations from the late 1970’s to the early 1990’s to
develop a broad code of conduct for MNCs. In 1972, the U.N. Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) requested the Secretary-General to appoint a group of eminent persons to study the
impact of multinational corporations on the world economy and to submit recommendations for
appropriate international action.41 The group recommended that ECOSOC establish an institution
to study MNCs.42 To that end, in 1974 ECOSOC adopted resolutions to establish both a UN intergovernmental commission and a UN center on transnational corporations.43 Those entities embarked

40

For a compendium containing short descriptions of several codes, see U.S. COUNCIL
FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY COMMITTEE , UCSIB COMPENDIUM
OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY INITIATIVES (2002). For an internet site with links to information
relating to various codes, see http://www.business-humanrights.org/Categories/Principles.
41

See E.S.C. Res. 1721 (LIII) (July 28, 1972).

42

See U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Aff., The Impact of Multinational Corporations on
Development and on International Relations, UN Doc. E/5500/Rev.1, ST/ESA/6, UN Sales No.
E.74.II.A.5, at 6-12 (1974).
43

See E.S.C. Res. 1908 (LVII) (Aug. 2, 1974); E.S.C. Res. 1913 (LVII) (Dec. 5, 1974).
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on the creation of a code of conduct on transnational corporations. Over the course of fifteen years,
various drafts of the code were formulated,44 with the most recent in 1990.
The 1990 draft code was divided into four parts on the activities of MNCs, the treatment of
MNCs, intergovernmental cooperation, and implementation of the code.45 With respect to the
activities of MNCs, the draft code set forth (1) various general rules (e.g., respect for local laws and
cultural traditions, respect for human rights, and avoiding corruption); (2) certain economic, financial
and social rules (e.g., acceptance of the ILO Tripartite Declaration discussed below and adherence
to national laws on consumer protection and the environment); and (3) rules on disclosure of
information. In the section on treatment of MNCs, the code contained certain rights of host states
but also protections to be accorded to MNCs, such as the right to fair and equitable treatment. The
code urged intergovernmental cooperation at all levels in the form of exchanges of information and
consultations. Finally, the code called upon states to disseminate the code, follow it within their
territories, and report to the United Nations on their implementation. The UN Commission on
transnational corporations, in turn, would receive such reports and periodically assess such
implementation.
The 1990 draft, however, was never finalized and never adopted by the UN General
Assembly due to serious disagreements among states that reflected in large part the resistance at that
time of developing states to “economic neo-colonization.” The draft code’s focus on not just the
conduct of MNCs but also the rights of host states led to sharp disagreement over the legal standard
44
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for expropriation of MNC property by a host state, as well as on issues such as the definition of
“MNC”(e.g., whether state-owned enterprises should be excluded), the jurisdiction of states, and the
legal status of the code.46 With respect to MNC conduct, strongly-polarized positions developed in
which developing states pressed for detailed and mandatory rules on MNC conduct, whereas
developed states preferred more general language to which MNCs would voluntarily adhere.47
Developing states emphasized reliance on host country national laws and regulations and resisted
having the code impose constraints on host governments. By contrast, developed states regarded
developing country national laws as often too complex or inadequate, and advocated having the code
refer to international law as the relevant body of law.48 Yet views within the developing world were
not monolithic, due largely to their differing levels of development.49
In the end, the draft code provided a template of sorts for codes that followed,50 but did not
itself achieve a UN imprimatur and has not been adopted by MNCs. By 1994, the United Nations
had significantly downgraded the UN inter-governmental commission and had terminated the UN
center on transnational corporations.51
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1977 ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles. With a broad code of conduct for MNCs was
not possible within the U.N. system, other codes that avoided addressing the rights of host states and
that pursued standards in specific fields, such as international labor law, international human rights
law, and international health law,52 met with more success. With respect to international labor law,
most standard-setting undertaken by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has occurred in the
context of developing binding treaties, although through a1998 non-binding declaration the ILO
arguably is moving in a direction of emphasizing certain core “principles” (freedom of association,
freedom from forced labor and from child labor, and non-discrimination in employment) as opposed
to labor “rights.”53 In 1977, however, the ILO Governing Body adopted a tripartite (government,
employer, worker) Declaration of Principles to guide MNEs and other stakeholders in the
development of policies directed toward social progress.54
The declaration calls for MNCs to pursue policies that promote equal opportunity, security,
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and collective bargaining in employment, and that preclude arbitrary dismissal, strike-breaking, and
other unfair practices. In doing so, the declaration calls for MNCs and others not only to obey local
laws and practices,55 but also to respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,56 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,57 the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights,58 and the ILO’s Constitution59 and 1998 declaration on fundamental
principles and rights at work.60 The Tripartite Declaration, however, is not legally binding, nor is it
subject to the reporting and monitoring systems for ILO conventions and recommendations adopted
by the ILO conference of the parties.61 While there is a procedure requiring governments to reply to
queries regarding implementation of the Declaration, and the possibility of dispute settlement before
the ILO Governing Body, the efficacy of such procedures appears doubtful.62
As for the Declaration’s overall effectiveness, some observers see the Declaration as “still
a ‘good’instrument, kept relevant by periodic surveys of the effect given to the Declaration by
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governments and by employers’ and worker’s organizations . . . .”63 Others are less impressed, and
not that the Declaration may suffer from a lack of institutional support. Professor Leary concludes:

The Declaration could be an important instrument if it were publicized and promoted by the
ILO and made better known to groups such as human rights and aid groups concerned with
issues relating to multinational enterprises. Trade unions have been the only constituency
referring to the Declaration and their efforts do not seem to have been particularly effective.64

2003 UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights Code on TNCs. In the field of human rights, the
UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights65 recently adopted a code
on the responsibilities of transnational corporations.66 The code recognizes that states have the
primary responsibility for the promotion and protection of human rights, but also asserts that MNCs
have such obligations as well.67 The code then sets forth six types of rights or obligations that MNCs
must observe: (1) right to equal opportunity and non-discriminatory treatment; (2) right to security
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of persons; (3) rights of workers, such as against forced labor or child labor, remuneration that
ensures an adequate standard of living, and right to collective bargaining; (4) respect for national
sovereignty (e.g., refraining from bribery) and human rights (e.g., right to food and drinking water);
(5) obligations with regard to consumer protection; and (6) obligations with regard to environmental
protection, such as complying with relevant national and international laws.68
One interesting component of this code is that it contains several provisions relating to
implementation. The code states that MNCs “shall” adopt “internal rules of operation in compliance”
with the code and shall periodically report on implementation, and shall incorporate the code into
their contracts with suppliers, distributors, licensees, and others.69 Further, the code states that TNCs
shall be subject to transparent and independent monitoring and verification by the United Nations
and “other international and national mechanisms already in existence or yet to be created”.70 The
code provides that states “should” establish the legal framework necessary for implementing the
code.71 Moreover, MNCs “shall provide prompt effective and adequate reparation to those persons”
adversely affected by failure to comply with the norms.72
Supporters of the code have heralded the code as a “landmark step” and even as the “first
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nonvoluntary initiative accepted at the international level.”73 Initial enthusiasm for the code,
however, has been muted. The Commission on Human Rights (which, unlike the Sub-Commission,
consists of representatives of governments) took note of the code, but in its recommendation to the
UN Economic and Social Council affirmed that the code “has not been requested by the Commission
and, as a draft proposal, has no legal standing, and that the Sub-Commission should not perform any
monitoring function in this regard.”74 Major international business organizations have criticized the
code as an inappropriate effort to “privative” vague human rights standards, in a manner that will
invite “highly subjective, politicized claims.”75
OECD Guidelines for MNEs. MNC codes of conduct need not be developed through the
United Nations or its specialized agencies: smaller groupings of states, such as the twenty-five
member European Union,76 or even individual states,77 have also pursued such codes. Codes drafted
by smaller groups of states may allow for greater specificity than more global codes, since they are
usually negotiated among governments with similar attitudes (e.g., among a group of developed
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states). While they are more limited in geographic scope, they can be highly relevant if the principal
concern is the conduct of MNCs based in such a bloc of states.
For example, in June 1976, the Council of Ministers if the thirty-three member Organization
of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) adopted a declaration on international
investment and multinational enterprises, to which was annexed a set of guidelines for multinational
enterprises.78 The guidelines basically establish recommended standards for good conduct for all
MNEs operating in or from OECD countries, including practices relating to taxation, financing, and
information disclosure. Further, the guidelines contain an “employment and industrial relations”
section prohibiting discrimination in the employment or promotion of personnel, establishing a
general standard that MNEs should “respect the right of their employees to be represented by trade
unions,” and containing other protections for laborers.79 The guidelines also include a section on
“environmental protection” stating that MNEs should “take due account of the need to protect the
environment and avoid creating environmentally related health problems” and setting forth various
means for doing so.80 The most recent revision of the guidelines, adopted in 2000, augments these
protections by including a new general policy stating that MNEs should “[r]espect the human rights
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of those affected by their activities consistent with the host government’s international obligations
and commitments.”81 Further, the 2000 guidelines address the vexing problem of corporate structure
by calling upon MNCs to “[e]ncourage, where practicable, business partners, including suppliers and
subcontractors, to apply principles of corporate conduct compatible with the Guidelines.”82 New
recommendations are added on the elimination of child labor and forced labor83 and on improving
internal environmental management and contingency planning for environmental impacts.84 The
sections on disclosure and transparency are updated to encourage social and environmental
accountability. 85 Finally, the 2000 guidelines add new sections on combating corruption and
consumer protection.86
As noted above, the guidelines do reference international law by calling for respect for human
rights “consistent with the host government’s international obligations and commitments.”87 The
guidelines, however, are not legally mandatory either on OECD governments or on OECD-based
companies. Rather, the declaration containing the guidelines represents a political commitment on
the part of OECD governments to foster such corporate conduct, and they reflect the values and
aspirations of OECD members. Both corporate and labor groups were involved in the drafting of the
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guidelines and thus they have enjoyed the general support of both communities.88 Each OECD
member has a “national contact point” (usually part of a government agency) charged with
promoting the guidelines within the member state and gathering information on adherence to them.89
Disputes concerning the guidelines can and have been referred to the OECD’s Committee on
Investment and Multinational Enterprises (CIME), a political body with no means of enforcing its
decisions.
The guidelines have met with mixed success. On the one hand, the guidelines have been used
by labor groups to pressure MNCs, sometimes through use of the OECD or cooperative national
governments (although in many instances the pressure concerns MNC activities in the developed
world).90 According to the most recent OECD report on the guidelines, the guidelines “now rank
among the world’s foremost corporate responsibility instruments,” are “cited by heads of state and
in the world business press,” and are referenced at 25,000 Internet pages.91 For some observers, the
guidelines “have represented the most successful multilateral instrument to date” addressing the
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conduct of MNCs in the field of foreign investment.92 On the other hand, the OECD report itself
noted sixty-four instances of alleged non-observance of the guidelines by MNCs that had been filed
with national contact points, principally on matters concerning employment and industrial relations.93
While it may still be too early to tell whether the 2000 revision will improve matters, some observers
of the initial guidelines found that “the OECD Member countries had no intention of sacrificing their
own control to follow the moral force behind those guidelines.”94

1999 UN Global Compact. In 1999, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced his
intention to create a UN-sponsored forum between the United Nations and the transnational business
community—known as the “Global Compact”—intended to promote good corporate practices in the
area of human rights, labor, and the environment.95 The principles set forth in the Global Compact
are similar to the Sullivan Principles, and draw upon the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,
the ILO 1998 fundamental principles on rights at work, and the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development.96 The Global Compact is far less detailed than the ILO tripartite declaration, the UN
Sub-Commission on Human Rights code, or the OECD guidelines discussed above, but the principal
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objective of the Global Compact should be seen as taking those codes to another level, by inviting
MNCs to join in the efforts of governments, international organizations, and non-governmental
organizations in projects that advance social and economic development.
The Global Compact principles state that businesses should: (1) “support and respect the
protection of internationally proclaimed human rights within their sphere of influence”; (2) “[m]ake
sure they are not complicit in human right abuses”; (3) “uphold the freedom of association and the
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining”; (4) eliminate “all forms of forced and
compulsory labor”; (5) abolish child labor; (6) eliminate “discrimination in respect of employment
and occupation”; (7) “support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges”; (8)
“[u]ndertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility”; (9) “[e]ncourage the
development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies”; and (10) “work against all
forms of corruption, including extortion and bribery”.97
The Secretary-General called upon leading companies to embrace these principles as part of
their corporate practices and to join in the efforts of governments, international organizations, and
non-governmental organizations in advancing social and economic development. To participate, a
company’s chief executive officer must send a letter (and endorsed by the company’s board of
directors) to the Secretary-General expressing support for the Global Compact. The company is then
expected to change its business operations so that the Global Compact principles become part of its
culture, day-to-day operations, and public communications. Moreover, the company is expected to
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publish in its annual report a description of the ways in which it is supporting the Global Compact,
such as by undertaking partnership projects with UN agencies or civil-society organizations.98 The
progress of participating companies will be posted on a U.N. Internet site along with comments by
civil society groups. By 2000, various companies—including BP, Daimler Chrysler, Dupont, Nike,
Novartis, Rio Tinto, and Shell—had announced their acceptance of the Global Compact, and as of
2004 several hundred had joined.
The Global Compact is a voluntary initiative: there is no legal obligation placed upon the
companies and no enforcement of such obligations, although companies must make submissions to
the United Nations that are then shared publicly. Instead of imposing legally binding obligations, the
Global Compact is, according to the United Nations, “designed to stimulate change and to promote
good corporate citizenship and encourage innovative solutions and partnerships.”99
Critics, however, including many developing states, note that the lack of monitoring let alone
enforcement provides little confidence that by joining the Global Compact, corporations will comply
with its principles.100 Indeed, critics believe that through the Global Compact major corporations may
simply “bluewash” their misconduct; that is, corporations would join the initiative and achieve a
public relations gain through association with the United Nations, but in the end would not
98

See UN Global Compact Office, How the Global Compact Works: Mission, Actors And
Engagement Mechanisms (2003). The concept of promoting partnerships among stakeholders
was also a key element of the World Summit on Sustainable Development that took place in
Johannesburg, South Africa in August/September 2002.
99

UN Global Compact, Frequently Asked Questions (undated), at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Portal/Default.asp.
100

See, e.g., Text of a Letter Addressed to Kofi Anan, Secretary-General of the United
Nations by a Group of Eminent Scholars and NGO Representatives from Around the World (July
20, 2000), reprinted in SETHI, supra note 13, at 126.

30
significantly change their conduct.101 Other corporations who join the Global Compact may already
be conducting themselves properly; there may even be adverse selection whereby corporations with
the least need to change are the ones who join. One observer characterizes the criticisms as finding
that “the Global Compact at best will be a gold old boys club and at worst a support group in which
like-minded corporations will share their experiences and encourage each other to do better next
time.”102
Codes Developed within the Private Sector. The codes discussed above were developed
principally by states acting through international organizations. There are also numerous codes of
conduct that have been established solely or principally in the private sector. In many instances, such
codes are the product of a single civil society group— such as Amnesty International’s Human
Rights Principles for Companies103 or the Workers Rights Consortium’s Model Code of
Conduct104—or of a particular company to regulate its own activities.105
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One well-known code developed within the private sector for addressing adverse social
impacts is the environmental management system (EMS) standards of the International Organisation
for Standardisation (ISO). The ISO is a non-governmental organization based in Geneva whose
members are national standards institutes from 146 states. While its members are not national
governments, many of the institutes are part of the governmental structure of their countries or are
mandated by their government.106 The ISO has focused on voluntary international standards both for
a wide range of products (such as standardization of screw threads) and for activities in producing
goods and services (such as quality management).107 Since ISO standards are developed by consensus
and are market-driven—where there is a need for MNCs (or others involved in transnational
business) to have a standard then the ISO pursues one—they appear to be used by many MNCs
worldwide. To date, the ISO has developed more than 12,000 standards, meaning documents
containing technical specifications or rules to ensure that products or services across an industry are
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in conformance.108
The ISO environmental management system standards issued in 1996,109 known as the ISO
14000 series, calls upon a company to establish and make publicly available an environmental policy
suitable to the company’s size and the environmental impact of its operations. That policy must
include compliance with local law and a general commitment to prevent pollution, but the ISO
14000 series does not prescribe specific standards that must be met (e.g., permissible toxic releases).
Further, the company must adopt procedures to assess and document the environmental impacts of
the company’s operations (such assessments need not be made public), and employees must be
trained in those procedures. Internal monitoring must occur, as well as either internal or external
audits. Companies may seek certification of conformance with the ISO code,110 and certain external
108
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certification bodies exist to that end. The ISO 14000 series provides guidance for such audits, such
as methodology and auditor qualifications, and also guidance on labeling goods and services as
environment-friendly. 111
As of December 2003, more than 66,000 ISO 14001 registrations had been completed
worldwide.112 Supporters laud the ISO approach as more “systematic, preventive and holistic” than
the types of command-and-control environmental regulation found in many states, which arguably
is piecemeal, uncoordinated, and focuses on remedies once harm has been done.113 Some observers
believe that ISO certification can help MNCs penetrate international markets.114
The ISO 14000 series, however, also has its critics. As noted above, the standards do not
actually set any specific requirements; they simply call for a “management systems approach” that
may or may not lead to environmentally-friendly results. While the standards call upon company’s
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to adhere to local laws, those laws may be poor or non-existent or unenforced. The ISO 14000 series
does not call upon company’s to adhere to relevant international instruments, such as treaties on
ozone depletion, biological diversity, or hazardous wastes, nor non-binding international
instruments, such as OECD or UN Environment Program (UNEP) guidelines. Further, while the
standards may prompt greater gathering and dissemination of information within the corporate
structure on adverse environmental effects, there is no requirement of release of such information
to the public, nor a requirement of an external audit, such that there is really no way of monitoring
externally if the company is acting in accordance with the standards nor how it is reacting with
adverse environmental effects are uncovered.115 Some critics note that the standards were negotiated
in theory with all stakeholders present (e.g., business, consumer, and environmental representatives),
but in reality the better-financed major business entities and developed states dominated the
negotiations, at the expense of smaller enterprises, non-governmental organizations and developing
states.116 At the same time, some developing states may be enthusiastic about the ISO 14000 series
because they are weak enough that developing state companies can readily comply and be regarded
as environment-friendly, thus avoiding potential consumer-driven trade sanctions in developed
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states.117
Codes Focused on Certain Industries. Because certain sectors of the transnational economy
have been susceptible to sharp criticism of their activities, codes have been developed by
stakeholders within those sectors tailored to their particular needs. For example, companies in the
extractive industries (i.e., oil extraction and mining) have had enormous impacts on the communities
in which they operate.118 As a result, these companies have been in the spotlight of activist efforts
to promote transnational corporate responsibility119 and also exposed to violent acts that seek to
disrupt their operations, which have led to aggressive security counter-measures. Over the course of
2000, the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, certain companies in the
extractive and energy sectors, and certain nongovernmental organizations met to discuss means for
companies in those sectors to protect and promote human rights when pursuing corporate security. 120
In December 2000, the participants announced an initiative—the Voluntary Principles on Security
and Human Rights—to guide such companies toward ensuring respect for human rights and
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fundamental freedoms while at the same time maintaining the safety and security of corporate
operations.121
The preamble to the Voluntary Principles states that they are guided by those set forth in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and contained in international humanitarian law. The
Voluntary Principles are then divided into three sections: risk assessment, companies’ relations with
public security, and their relations with private security. The first section notes that assessing risk
in the states where a company operates is critical not just for the security of company personnel and
assets, but also for the promotion and protection of human rights. The principles call upon
companies to assess a series of risk factors (e.g., the risk of transferring lethal equipment to public
and private security forces) based on credible information from a broad range of perspectives,
including civil society knowledgeable about local conditions. The second section calls upon
companies to “use their influence” with public security services so as not to (1) use the services of
individuals credibly implicated in human rights abuses; (2) use force unless “strictly necessary and
to an extent proportional to the threat”; and (3) violate the rights of individuals when they are
exercising the rights of freedom of association and peaceful assembly, the right to engage in
collective bargaining, or other related rights.122 The third section calls for companies to follow
similar principles with respect to private security providers, and further urges them to include such
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principles in contracts with such providers (thus allowing termination of the contract if the principles
are not followed).
A U.S. government official heralded the Voluntary Principles as significant not just because
they provide a basis for a global standard on security and human rights in the oil, mining and energy
sector, but also because they form a foundation for further dialogue between industry in that sector
and civil society. 123 Whether the principles will have a significant influence remains to be seen, but
they appear to be taken into account by MNCs in pursuing new extractive projects. For example, in
the 1990’s, enormous natural gas reserves were located off the shore of the Indonesian province of
Papua (formerly known as Irian Jaya), which occupies the western half of the tropical island of New
Guinea. Indonesia decided to develop the gas reserves by removing the gas from its location,
processing the gas into liquefied natural gas (LNG), and then transporting it. The U.K./U.S. oil and
gas company BP became a principal shareholder in (and the operator of) this project—known as the
Tangguh LNG Project124—but BP was concerned that it might face considerable criticism for
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potential adverse effects of the project in Papua.125
Consequently, BP participated in the drafting of the Voluntary Principles and then publicly
stated its adherence as a matter of corporate policy to the standards set forth therein.126 Moreover,
BP established a Tangguh Independent Advisory Panel to provide external advice to senior BP
decision-makers. Chaired by former U.S. Senator George Mitchell, the panel was charged, among
other things, with advising on the project’s effects on the local community, and on the impact on
political, economic, and social conditions in Indonesia generally and in Papua in particular.127 Since
its inception in 2001, the panel has met with a wide variety of Indonesians, from government
officials down to directly affected Papuans, and has provided public reports to BP on its findings and
recommendations. Among other things, the second annual report concluded that BP was committed
to abide by the Voluntary Principles and had met that commitment, and offered recommendations
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for further use of the Voluntary Principles with respect to certain aspects of the project.128

III.

WHETHER THE CODES WILL WITHER

As indicated in the prior section, several voluntary codes of conduct for MNCs have emerged
in recent years that seek to ameliorate adverse societal effects of MNC activity, especially in the
developing world. Based on the reports and literature surrounding these codes, these codes do appear
to be helping to reshape cultural attitudes within at least some MNCs, by raising corporate awareness
of potentially adverse MNC activity in the developing world and creating benchmarks by which
external groups may measure MNC behavior.129 One recent study of codes relating to international
labor rights focused on case studies of four different industries across four different geographic
regions and concluded, among other things, that such codes “have the potential to generate direct
improvements in the conditions of workers and communities in the global supply chains of major
industries.”130 Code enthusiasts hope that MNCs will increasingly see the benefits of upholding key
societal values and thereby enrich the environment in which they operate. Such optimism regarding
the codes may be warranted; the “arc” of their use by MNCs is, on its face, fairly impressive given
the minimal MNC attention given to such issues thirty years ago.
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At the same time, such codes have their critics, and the critics have been articulate and
aggressive in voicing their concerns. In particular, the voluntary nature of the codes leads many
observers to see the codes as largely or potentially MNC public relations ploys.131 On this account,
MNCs may purport to follow such codes, but do so only with varying degrees of seriousness.
Notwithstanding anecdotal success stories,132 for the critics there remain too many instances of
adverse social effects of MNC activity133 to conclude that voluntary codes in their present form alone
are the solution. As Janelle Diller of the International Labour Organization notes

Even if transnational private initiative can present a sustainable “high road” for business
conduct amidst the complexities of global transactions over time, claims by enterprises and
other actors concerning social improvements achieved through private initiatives are not
easily categorized, evaluated or compared. Some controversy may thus be inevitable. These
initiatives operate across diverse economic, political and legal contexts, without standard
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reference points or generally accepted methods of development, implementation or
assessment. A number of implications therefore arise from limitations inherent I the way
such initiatives are developed, implemented and ultimately assessed.134

Over time, if the codes remain in nature as they presently are, while demands for social and
environmental justice increase, the codes may lose much of the their legitimacy. 135 Consumers,
shareholders, and other stakeholders may not feel that adoption of a code has any significance; that
the code is disingenuous. At best, current criticisms may persist; at worst, if demands for greater
corporate responsibility increase, the notion of allowing the “fox” to guard the “hen-house” may fall
into severe disrepute, such that the codes whither in meaning, if not in form.136
The unease with voluntary codes of conduct has led to calls for transforming the codes into
binding law, both at the international and national level.137 Some treaties already exist designed to
reign in corporate misconduct: ranging from ILO treaties and regulations (some dating to the early
twentieth century) to recent initiatives concerning corporate bribery of officials138 and corporate
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exports of tobacco.139 One can imagine aggressively pursuing the transformation of the existing
voluntary codes into treaty law, either on a broad scale or in selected areas, with appropriate
enforcement or monitoring mechanisms.140 One can also imagine adopting new national “command
and control” legislation codifying and developing such norms,141 and further can imagine urging
international and national courts to use the codes as though they expressed rules of law.142 If over
time this is the fate of voluntary corporate codes, then as they wither away, the codes will be viewed
as simply stepping stones in the crystallization of law.
There are, however, reasons to doubt that such a movement toward binding law will succeed,
at least in the near term. Many of the binding treaties on issues addressing corporate conduct have
secured low rates of ratification, such as several of the ILO treaties. There remain considerable
differences of views among blocs of states—and not just between North and the South—regarding

http://www.oecd.org; OAS Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, OAS
Doc. B-58, 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996), available at http://www.oas.org; Council of Europe Criminal
Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, ETS No. 173, 38 I.L.M. 505 (1999); Organization
of African Unity Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, July 11, 2003, available
at http://www.africa-union.org.
139

Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, May 21, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 518 (2003),
available at <http://www.who.int/tobacco>. The FCTC was adopted by WHA Res. 56.1 (May
21, 2003).
140

Ratner, supra note 129, at 538-40.

141

See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 131, at 500-504 (calling for enactment in the United
States of a federal “Foreign Human Rights Abuse Act” as well as revocation of corporate
charters by the several states of the United States when MNCs act improperly). In 1989-91,
Congress considered but did not adopt legislation that would formulate a code of conduct for
U.S. corporations doing business in the Soviet Union and in China. See Frey, supra note 48, at
170-71.
142

See, e.g., Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 73, at 919-21.

43
the development of such conventions, which suggests that successes in crafting new agreements will
be difficult. National legislation remains a possibility, but developed states are wary of adopting
constraints on their MNCs that place them at a competitive disadvantage. Unless the enactment of
national laws can be coordinated among blocs of states, the development of such laws will likely
prove problematic. Perhaps most importantly, MNCs—who remain powerful actors to whom
governments pay heed will resist such transformation into binding law. Indeed, the reason voluntary
codes were adopted to begin with was because of the political obstacles and legal complications in
regulating non-state entities who operate across borders, and because of a desire to preserve some
level of flexibility in the regulation of such actors as well as promote true “internalization” of values
by MNCs. Those same factors will continue to make direct regulation of MNC activity problematic.
This essay suggests that far greater attention should be given, at least in the near term, to a
middle way, one that falls between simple reliance on voluntary codes as they are currently
structured and, alternatively, pursuing their transformation into binding law. The middle way would
seek to bring governments more actively back into the process of promoting good corporate conduct,
but would do so by both reinforcing the value and benefits of the voluntary codes to MNCs and
holding MNCs to the codes to which they have subscribed. In other words, while these codes may
reflect an aspect of the decline of the nation-state, a fertile area for buttressing the codes—for
ensuring their survival and effectiveness—may well lie in more creative use of the power of nationstates.

IV.

TAKING THE CODES SERIOUSLY
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Rather than view “command-and-control” laws as the next best step in addressing MNC
conduct, policy-makers should consider a range of governmental initiatives that reinforce the value
and benefits of the voluntary codes to MNCs (in other words, creating “carrots”), while at the same
time holding MNCs to the codes to which they have subscribed (creating “sticks”). At the heart of
this approach is the notion that MNCs are not required to adopt a particular code; the code remains
a voluntary set of normative constraints that the MNC may embrace or not as it wishes. However,
governments can pursue legislative and administrative initiatives that make adoption of a code more
attractive to MNCs, while at the same time pursuing initiatives that increase the likelihood that the
MNC will adhere to the code it has voluntarily adopted. To be effective, government policy should
balance the use of “carrots” and “sticks.” If only carrots are created, more MNCs may be pulled into
the adoption of corporate codes, but with spotty adherence. If only sticks are created, MNCs may
view the adoption of codes as undesirable burdens.
Among the “carrots” that governments might pursue that reinforce the value and benefits of
the voluntary codes to MNCs are the following.
Getting stakeholders together. Governments should pay more attention to the possibility of
lending their weight to convening groups of stakeholders in a particular problem area, for the
purpose of having them develop a voluntary code deemed appropriate by all. As seen in discussion
above of the Voluntary Principles for extractive industries, governments can have a catalytic effect
in bringing diverse groups together and pressing them to negotiate an appropriate code. MNCs in a
particular industry or region may find such government participation useful if they anticipate
recurrent attacks by civil society groups on their activities, and if government involvement can help
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bring such groups to the table in a manner that the MNCs see as constructive.143 Civil society groups
may also welcome such government involvement, since governments, as regulators, have influential
relationships with MNCs and can press MNCs to participate in the development of a meaningful
code.
Setting a code for the codes. One of the principal attractions for MNCs to voluntary codes
is that such codes provide considerable flexibility for the MNC in developing its own internal code
of conduct; different types of codes can be developed for different industries and MNCs within
industries, tailored to their particular needs and capabilities. While such flexibility can and should
be maintained, it should also be possible to develop better standards for what an internal MNC code
should look like (a “code for codes”), and governments—again acting as a facilitator of stakeholder
interests—may be in the best position to do so. A minimalist code for codes might look something
like the UN Global Compact—simply calling for MNCs to adhere to codes that address certain core
issues, such as labor, human rights, environmental harm, and corruption, or it might look like the
OECD Guidelines—elaborating on the standards that any MNC code should include (e.g., a
commitment to abide by national laws in states where the MNC operates). But a minimalist code for
codes might contain other features common to all existing internal MNC codes, such as calling for
MNCs, if they subscribe to a code, to publicly adopt it in writing and to train employees in the code.
A more ambitious code for codes could address further procedural aspects that any MNC code
should include, such as providing employees with a mechanism (e.g., a hotline or helpline) to surface
concerns about corporate compliance with the MNC code. Even more ambitious still would be a
code for codes that clarified the different means by which an MNC could achieve transparency
143
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regarding its adherence to the code, the means by which such adherence might be monitored,
verified, audited, or certified, both internally and externally, and standards for what would constitute
true independent scrutiny by qualified persons.144 Indeed, the code for codes might indicate different
“tiers” of scrutiny, from least rigorous to most rigorous, such that MNCs who adopt a code could
indicate where they fall on a spectrum of scrutiny, thus perhaps inducing higher levels of
oversight.145
The overall purpose of such a code for codes would not be to require MNCs to adopt any
particular code but, rather, to provide a “quality control” template (or the “standard reference
points”) that would reduce the likelihood of sham MNC codes. If such a template helped guide
shareholders, consumers, and others in determining whether a code adopted by an MNC was a
legitimate effort to achieve good corporate conduct, then MNCs may find adoption to stronger and
more effective codes in their interest. Indeed, a logical next step might be for governments to endorse
particular MNC codes as meeting the requirements of the code for codes, thus helping to differentiate
codes that fall short.146
Leniency from regulators. Governments are regulators of MNCs in various ways, ranging
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from securities disclosure laws to occupational safety laws to environmental protection laws, and
so on. In many countries, such regulation of MNCs operates only territorially; governments do not
generally seek to regulate extraterritorially unless MNC actions abroad have some effect within the
government’s territory.147 In some instances, however, governments do regulate the conduct of
MNCs abroad,148 and in any event regulators may be granted considerable discretion when
interpreting their mandate to regulate. As such, governments should consider whether by statute,
regulation, or administrative rule more can be done to use voluntary codes as a device for favorable
treatment to an MNC. To the extent that the regulator uses adherence to a voluntary code as a means
for according an MNC favorable treatment, then the MNC will view adherence to the code as more
attractive.
One relevant concept in this regard is the idea of “safe harbors.”149 Where there is a general
standard to which an MNC is exposed under national law, and then a more specific rule that tells an
MNC that it has met the standard, then that more specific rule operates as a “safe harbor”; an MNC
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can rely on following the rule as a means for satisfying the standard. Where government regulators
have the power to hold MNCs to certain standards regarding their conduct abroad, then by
establishing adherence to a voluntary code as a means for meeting that standard provides the MNC
with a safe harbor, and concomitantly augments the value of having and adhering to such a code.
Certain factors that in general make a safe harbor more attractive150 may be present with
respect to voluntary codes for MNCs, depending on the national laws to which the safe harbor
applies. If a national legal system is imposing a relatively vague standard on MNC activity abroad,
the MNC may find it difficult to ensure full compliance with the standard if there are numerous
MNC transactions at issue and if there is great uncertainty regarding how to comply with the
standard. Further, the MNC may face high costs if it were to pre-clear its activities with regulators
and high costs if its conduct is found non-conforming. In such situations, adoption of an internal
MNC code that meets conditions acceptable to the regulator may be very attractive to the MNC as
a safe harbor. Obviously, the government may wish to consider setting certain conditions regarding
what codes would be regarded as acceptable, as discussed in the prior sub-section.
Leniency in criminal prosecution. The same concept may be employed with respect to
leniency in criminal prosecution, assuming that there are national criminal laws regulating MNC
conduct abroad.151 For example, in November 1991, the U.S. Sentencing Commission issued
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Guidelines for Organizations,152 which are used by U.S. Attorneys in weighing whether to charge the
organization and used by judges in sentencing an organization. For organizations that evince “an
effective program to prevent and detect violations of law,” the guidelines provide for a lesser
punishment even if a violation transpires. Such a program must include the organization establishing
“compliance standards and procedures to be followed by its employees and other agents that are
reasonably capable of reducing the prospect of criminal conduct.”153 Governments should consider
whether, for criminal statutes relating to MNC activity abroad, the MNC’s voluntary adoption of a
corporate code merits leniency in charging and sentencing. Again, by doing so, governments would
serve to buttress the value and benefit to an MNC in adopting a meaningful code.
Leniency with respect to civil claims. Governments could also consider a similar approach
with respect to civil suits against MNCs for misconduct abroad.154 To the extent that a government’s
national law allows civil suits for such conduct,155 then the government might encourage courts to
view an MNC’s adoption of a voluntary code as a basis for certain evidentiary presumptions or for
committed by its own nationals, officers or agents.”).
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mitigation of damages. Such encouragement might take the form of a statute, regulation, or overall
statement of policy, or might take the form of friend-of-the-court interventions by the government
in particular civil suits as claims arise.156
For instance, while the Nigerian Senate recently adopted a resolution ordering Shell
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria to pay $1.5 billion as compensation for environmental
degradation, health problems, and loss of livelihood,157 an alternative—and likely more constructive
—approach to a civil compensation scheme would seek to promote good MNC behavior in advance
of harm occurring, by developing a civil penalty scheme in which voluntary codes feature as a
potential means of limiting MNC liability. Again, if carefully constructed, such leniency would
encourage MNCs to adhere to the voluntary code, thereby decreasing the likelihood that harm will
occur.
Government procurement and financing. Governments should consider including in their
regulations and policies on procurement of goods and services a role for MNC adherence to
voluntary codes. For example, the U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulations relating to suspension or
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51
debarment of a government contractor for irresponsible behavior recognize as a mitigating factor
“[w]hether the contractor had effective standards of conduct and internal control systems in place
at the time of the activity which constitutes cause for debarment or had adopted such procedures
prior to any Government investigation of the activity cited as a cause for debarment.”158 Individual
U.S. government agencies then supplement the FAR to set forth their expectations regarding ethics
and conduct of those from whom they procure goods and services.159 It would be a natural extension
of such requirements for government agencies engaged in commercial relations with MNCs to
require that the MNC adopt a voluntary code of a type determined by the government to be
appropriate and effective. Similarly, government decision-making with respect to financing of
development projects—whether financed directly by governments or through international financial
institutions—might look for ways to make adoption of and adherence to a voluntary code a condition
of such financing. 160
Such “carrots” would be helpful in pulling MNCs into codes, but governments should also

158

Federal Acquisition Regulations, FAR Reg. 9.401-1(a)(1) (2001). available at
http://farsite.hill.af.mil/VFFARa.HTM.
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See, e.g., Dep’t of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations, DFAR Reg. 203.7000
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of the International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mexico, 18-22 March
2002, UN Doc. A/CONF.198/11, para. 23 (2002), available at
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consider steps that might be taken to ensure that the codes adopted by MNCs are effective in
conditioning MNC behavior. Among the “sticks” that governments might pursue to make it more
likely that the MNC will adhere to the code it has voluntarily adopted are the following.
Promoting transparency. Through government laws, regulations, or administrative rules,
governments might require that, when MNCs adopt an internal code of conduct, they divulge
publicly information about what the code says, who is trained in the code and how, and information
on whether and how the code is monitored and audited. Such disclosure of information might be
required as part of laws that allow corporations to form or securities laws that require corporations
to divulge information pertinent to shareholder decision-making. While such disclosure may be
burdensome to an MNC, it also serves the objective of accountability of the MNCs to its
shareholders, and makes “more effective the market mechanisms that steer companies towards
responsible conduct . . . .”161
Promoting truth-in-advertising. To the extent that MNCs are using their adherence to
voluntary codes as a means of assuaging public concerns about their activities abroad, then MNCs
should be prepared to have those claims scrutinized as a matter of consumer protection laws. Such
scrutiny could take the form of periodic investigations by government consumer protection offices.
Additionally, governments might consider opening the court-room doors to civil claims whereby
private attorneys-general pursue judicial review of MNC claims. For example, when Nike
Corporation allegedly made false statements of fact about its labor practices and about working
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conditions in factories that made its products, the Supreme Court of California found that such
statements could violate California statutes on false advertising and unfair competition laws, and that
such statements were not protected free speech.162
Promoting oversight processes. As has been previously noted, existing codes containing
various levels of oversight, which may consist of internal or external monitoring, verification, audits,
or certifications. While requiring MNCs to adopt a particular form of oversight would likely run
afoul of the inherent flexibility of the code approach, governments might nevertheless endorse as a
part of the code on codes discussed above criteria for desirable oversight techniques. Moreover,
governments through national laws, regulations, or administrative rules could license persons
performing such functions, thereby ensuring higher quality auditors and certifiers. As governments
gain increasing experience with use of non-governmental monitors on matters such as maritime
safety163 and port security,164 governments should move toward developing appropriate normative
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structures for ensuring the integrity of such monitors, including those used by MNCs to validate
adherence to voluntary codes.

V.

CONCLUSION

A U.S. government representative recently noted that the

promise of rich governments to give 0.7 percent of their gross domestic product to poorer
countries remains not only a promise, it is a relic, its actual dollars now dwarfed by
significantly larger sums of private capital flows. Far-flung colonial empires have been
replaced by corporations, the borderless empires of which are more suited to the nimble
responses in a world that demands them.165

This rise of MNCs as globally dominant economic forces has been characterized by an extensive
movement of capital, goods and services across borders, which gives MNCs enormous influence on
the working conditions of their laborers in developing countries and on the environmental effects
of their operations without any countervailing power exercised by nation-states. A central question
is whether globalization of the markets that has occurred over the past thirty years is sustainable
without a better normative structure—whether such MNC dominance will increasingly trigger
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backlashes by laborers, consumers, and other stakeholders because the benefits of MNC activity are
distributed too unequally. While it is true that capitalism, at its core, entails freedom to pursue
economic self-interest, it is equally true that capitalism in developed states only survived the
challenge of socialist and communist movements by developing a distributive system of social
benefits that was perceived as equitable, fair, and just.
Existing voluntary codes may preclude such backlashes, but they may also be seen as
inadequate, leading to demands for greater government regulation MNCs. In the long-term, MNCs
may be best served by finding ways to make voluntary codes more meaningful and effective. In that
regard, this essay suggests that greater attention should be given to the role of governments in
augmenting such codes, and to that end suggests several “carrots” and “sticks” that governments
might deploy. Such devices may prove politically difficult or impossible for some governments, but
to the extent they can be achieved, they may help promote a synergy between government regulation
and MNC self-regulation, one that will help ease the frictions associated with the decline of the
nation-state so presciently observed by Oscar Schachter.

